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1 Introduction
Eco-labeling has become a standard practice in most countries (Vossenaar 1997).1 A market-
based reason for their existence is a signal of higher environmental quality which might not
be fully assessed on behalf of the customers willing to pay for the products environmental
attributes. In theory, labeling therefore constitutes an e¢ cient, non-mandatory, instrument of
environmental policy. While the positive environmental benets of credible eco-labeling schemes
are clear, some argue that these programs have become an important factor in market access
generating pressures for the producers to apply for a label. This has contributed to a several
trade-disputes as national eco-labeling schemes are often perceived discriminating and generating
distortional e¤ects on trade. These distortions have fueled a public debate about an appropriate
level of di¤erentiation between regional labeling standards in the global markets.2
There are two suggested remedies for the problem of multiple country-specic labels. Har-
monization of labeling standards has certain benets. It helps the exporters sell their products
without having to comply with di¤erent regulations in each country, and increases market trans-
parency by ensuring the consumers that imported goods comply with the same standards. The
second remedy is mutual recognition of existing labeling schemes. This means that if a product
is eligible for a label granted by a national labeling program, it would automatically receive an
equal treatment with any other label in the importing countries. Mutual recognition arguably
provides exibility from the viewpoint of the producing countries for it allows them for more
leverage to consider country-specic characteristics in the design of labeling standards.3
The economic trade-o¤ between these policy schemes is linked to an old issue in competition
policy debate; namely, market transparency. Less transparency on the consumer side, so that
consumers are uninformed about the product characteristics, usually diminishes the producers
1These programs are designed by an independent intermediary, which imposes and monitors certain criteria that
producers must meet in order to receive a certication for their environmental performance. Third-party labeling
tend to perform better than industry-led programs in correcting for the problem of asymmetric information between
producers and consumers. See, e.g. Kirchho¤ (2000) and Cason and Gangadharan (2002).
2For example, Germany requires companies not participating in its Green Dot scheme to take back their
packaging and bear the cost of recycling themselves. The cost is naturally greater for foreign companies, which
therefore have claimed that the for Green Dot label places imported goods at a market disadvantage.
3 It is implausible to presume that countries have identical environmental characteristics or social preferences
on which the labeling standards should be based. For instance, Scandinavian countries and Canada are by far
more sensitive to acid rain generated by the release of oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) than
countries in Central Europe and US.
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incentives for product di¤erentiation (see e.g. Bester 1998 and Akerlof 1970). This is arguably
a problem under mutual recognition, as goods with higher environmental standards might not
survive the competition in the markets.4 To prevent the collapse of markets for goods with
high environmental quality, it is therefore plausible to think that the optimal coordination of
eco-labeling schemes calls for harmonization.
This paper explains why, despite the potential lack of market transparency, mutual recogni-
tion of labeling standards in the international markets could be welfare superior to harmonization.
In a specic example involving vertically di¤erentiated industry and asymmetric information
about the environmental quality of the products, this means that a small market failure gen-
erated by the lack of transparency induces more producers to apply for a label. The positive
welfare e¤ect of mutual recognition is that tougher competition between producers makes the
labeled goods more a¤ordable to consumers, improving the overall quality in the market.
Essentially, the model combines several features in the literature on industrial organization,
signaling games and international trade. The main contributions of this paper will be derived in
three steps. The rst step presents a benchmark involving closed markets and full information.
The market is segmented by consumer types with di¤erent willingness to pay for the products
environmental quality and a price competition between rms induces a market outcome involv-
ing di¤erent qualities.5 The second step introduces asymmetric information to the model. This
reects the usual property that sellers are often better informed about the production related
environmental attributes of the goods than consumers; hence, the extent to which they can cap-
italize on the consumerswillingness to pay depends on their ability to signal the improvements
in their environmental performance to consumers.6
4A dispute, which is at least partly driven by this trade-o¤, is between the dominant forest certicates in Europe,
Pan European Forest Certicate (PEFC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Each side has a strong nationally
divided group of representatives. For instance, most Finnish forest owners are certied by PEFC while the Swedish
forests belong dominantly to FSC program. The representatives of PEFC argue that FSC requirements do not
consider the regional di¤erences between forests ecological characteristics and the ownership structure. PEFC
thus claims that both certicates should be treated equally as there is only minor di¤erences between the actual
requirements. However, FSC and some environmental organizations argue that any labeling program, which does
not meet FSC standards, is insu¢ cient to guarantee environmentally sound forest management and consumers
should question the environmental attributes of PEFC-labeled products. See, e.g. "Anything Goes" (2001) by
Greenpeace and The Finnish Nature League.
5See e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). More recently, Cremer and Thisse (1999) employed a similar
vertical product di¤erentiation framework and show that environmental quality competition improves the overall
quality on the market, but in the absence of government intervention the equilibrium fails to satisfy the criteria
for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
6 In a seminal article Akerlof (1970) established that under asymmetric information markets are ine¤ective in
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The examination of the price-signaling game shows that producers cannot implement a sepa-
rating equilibrium, in which consumers observe the di¤erences between the environmental qual-
ities in the market. This results in a collapse of markets for goods with high environmental
quality, unless there is a labeling program monitored by an independent third party.7 Labeling
enhances the quality distribution in the market, but the market outcome fails to satisfy the crite-
ria for Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of environmental quality. This is because in a closed economy a
labeling program does not provide incentives for new producers to enter the market, leaving the
incumbent rms with market power which they can employ to price discriminate the consumers.
The analysis of the signaling game in a single market serves as building block for the third
step of the analysis which considers two countries with two rms producing for the domestic and
a third country export market. Within this framework the analysis shows that under mutual
recognition between country specic labels, the signaling problem carries over to the export
market: When the export market consists of producers with di¤erent labeling standards, the ones
with higher standards cannot implement a separating equilibrium. This generates an information
rent for the producers with lower labeling standards, inducing more producers to apply for this
label. Tougher competition in the market for labeled goods depresses prices, but does not drive
the higher quality out of the market, and thereby increases the market e¢ ciency making higher
environmental quality more a¤ordable to consumers. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes,
the analysis shows that a market failure in the form of lower market transparency has a pro-
competitive spillover that implements an equilibrium which Pareto dominates harmonization.
Market transparency, product di¤erentiation, eco-labeling and the signaling problem have
been touched upon before in the economic literature. However, the analysis of the international
dimensions of labeling and transparency in the presence of credence attributes has not been
conclusive. Most of the literature on quality signaling examines the interaction between one
rm and consumers, abstracting from signaling between competing senders.8 The literature
on oligopoly-signaling focuses on cost-signaling between competing rms and, as in the present
providing quality and only goods with lowest quality are sold to the market.
7There is a number of studies on asymmetric information and quality-signaling, but the most severe problem,
namely, the case of goodscredence attributes has deserved less attention (see e.g. Shapiro 1982). This problem
is particularly relevant for most internationally traded goods with production related environmental externalities,
since the consumers may have diminished ability to learn the goodsenvironmental quality, because of the physical
distance between the production and consumption sites.
8For instance Milgrom and Roberts (1986) examine the price and advertising signaling in monopoly.
4
study, quality-signaling between rms and consumers.9 Included among these are Herzendorf
and Overgaard (2000); Herzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002), which
examine price signaling behavior of rms without established reputation.10
Kirchho¤ (2000) examines the role of third-party labels in producersenvironmental quality
decision, when a monopolist can build reputations and the qualities are revealed with a certain
probability. The results establish that third-party labeling increases the likelihood that compli-
ance to voluntary environmental standards is protable for the monopolist. For the general case
of labeling standards and trade, Jansen and Lincé de Faria (2002) compared mutual recognition
and harmonization for two countries with di¤erent consumer preferences and cost di¤erences.
The study showed that harmonization, in most cases, leads to a better welfare outcome than
mutual recognition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the assumptions of
the model. Section three establishes the criteria for welfare optimal distribution of environmental
quality, and examines rmsquality decisions under full information and autarky. Section four
analyzes the signaling game under asymmetric information, and compares the results with full
information and Pareto e¢ cient benchmarks. Section ve analyzes how third-party labeling
inuences the industry-equilibrium in domestic and foreign markets. Conclusions follow.
2 The Model
We consider a partial equilibrium model, in which good x is produced in two countries, domestic
and foreign. When needed, subscripts d and f are used as a mnemonic for domestic and foreign
country. In each country there are two incumbent rms and n potential entrants. The incum-
bent rms are denoted by superscripts 1 and 2; and the entrants are denoted by superscript
N = (3; 4; :::; n). The rms produce good x for domestic and world market. The remaining
assumptions of the model are comparable to those used in the literature on vertical product
di¤erentiation:
1. Abatement: Production of x generates an environmental externality (emissions), e =
(e  a); where e denotes laizzes faire emission level, and a 2 (a; a) denotes the abatement
9For information on signaling as a mechanism to deter entry, see, e.g. Bagwell and Ramey (1991).
10Herzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002) also allow for advertising signals.
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level; where a > 0 is the minimum abatement requirement for an active rm. Abatement
level a denotes the most e¢ cient, technically feasible, abatement level.
2. Production costs: For each active rm, a short-term cost function takes the form C(a) > 0
8a > a and C(a) = 0 otherwise. The cost is constant in quantity, but convex in abatement:
C 0(a) > 0 and C 00(a) > 0: In addition, each rm that upgrades its technology from, say ai
to aj ; and wishes to inform the consumers about it, incurs a xed set-up and advertisement
cost, j(aj) = , before the production stage.11 The cost satises,
C(aj)  C(ai)  j(aj) for any aj > ai  a (1)
reecting that the unit-cost di¤erence between a goods with di¤erent quality is higher
than the set-up and advertisement cost. The incumbent rms have an initial abatement
technology a. Hence, they may produce with minimum quality level without additional
costs. A representative entrant has an initial abatement level aN = 0. Entry thus requires
an upgrade to a and a cost equal to N (a) = .12
3. Preferences and asymmetric information: The description of consumer preferences is
a version of Mussa and Rosen (1978). In each country there is a continuum of consumers
uniformly distributed and ranked in the same interval in decreasing order of their intensity
of preferences for goodsenvironmental quality  2 [; ]  [0; 1]. The density is given by
M > n + 2; i.e. in each country there is less potential producers than consumers. When
the quality of the goods is perfectly observable, the indirect utility of purchasing one unit
of good x is conditional on consumers type  and can be formalized as
U(p; ) = [R+ (  )a  p(a)] (2)
where R denotes the reservation value, which represents common willingness to pay for
the goods basic physical characteristics with any given quality. Parameter  > 1 is the
11Advertising in this context means announcements about the product quality, which are not veried by a third
party.
12Condition (1) thus states that  is small enough to ensure non-negative payo¤ for the entrant that chooses
quality ai, provided that the rival rmsquality is higher and there is positive demand for the product variety.
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common component in consumers preferences for environmental quality.13 In a full infor-
mation environment a denotes the environmental attribute of the good determined by the
sellers abatement technology, and p(a) is the price of the good. Thus, (  )a determines
consumer-specic marginal willingness to pay for this quality.
The environmental quality is considered a credence attribute, which cannot be observed
even after the purchase.14 Consumers have, however, a prior idea about the initial distri-
bution of qualities in the market and observe the cost-structure described in assumption
(2). This gives a raise to a signaling game in which the rms can use prices to a¤ect the
consumersbeliefs about their environmental quality.
The signaling game has two stages. The consumers enter the market with a prior distribu-
tion of qualities in their minds. The rms set prices and the consumers update their beliefs
about the goodsenvironmental qualities on the basis of the available information.15 When
a price-signal p(a) is perceived credible by the consumer , her utility of the purchase co-
incides with (2), i.e. U = U [p(a); ]. However, in a market with di¤erent qualities and
no credible price-signal, the consumer-specic marginal willingness to pay for the goods
environmental quality is the same for any good in the market. Hence, the indirect utility in
a pooling equilibrium can be described by the following von Neuman-Morgenstern utility
function
U e[p(c); )] = [R+ (  )c   p(c)];
where c =
NP
i=1
ai
N and N denotes the number of active rms.
16 This indicates that the per-
ceived environmental quality in a pooling equilibrium is determined by the average quality
in the market. From the specication of the utility function it follows immediately that al-
though the consumers willingness to pay increases when a producer chooses to increase his
quality, only the goods with the lowest price survive in the market. Hence, the market for
high qualities will collapse, unless the producers can credibly signal their qualities through
13The role of parameter  is treated in more detail in assumption 5.
14This is a plausible assumption, especially in the case of internationally traded goods with long geographi-
cal distance between production and consumption locations. Firms cannot build reputations, as the quality is
unobservable. For more information on reputation-building and product quality, see Shapiro (1982). For more
information on credence attributes and signaling through labeling see Auriol and Schilizzi (2003).
15A more detailed description of the consumersbelief system is in subsection 2.1.
16See also Jansen and Lincé de Faria (2002).
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labeling or price-signaling.
4. Market coverage: The preferences and the cost function have the following properties:
C(a)  R and C 0(a)  (  ); (3)
Expression (3) states that if goods are priced at marginal cost, then all consumers buy the
highest quality.17 Furthermore, when the lowest quality in the market is priced at C(a),
all consumers buy a good regardless of the quality-distribution.
5. Quality decision and asymmetric information: The quality game between the rms
is sequential: Nature chooses the incumbent that gets to choose its quality rst. After
the incumbentsquality decision, the entrants choose quality levels.18 The quality levels
are observable, but non-veriable. Specically, the existing qualities are observed by each
agent, but they cannot be linked to a particular rm.19
6. Labeling and mutual recognition: Under third-party labeling, an independent inter-
mediary monitors rmsperformance and grants a label for a rm that meets the given
labeling requirement. Consumers perceive the label as a credible signal of the goodsenvi-
ronmental quality. Mutual-recognition of labels implies that when the market consists of
multiple labels, consumers observe the existing quality-requirements, but without further
information they cannot ascertain the potential di¤erences between environmental qualities
indicated by the labels.
7. The structure of the full game: The structure of the game is depicted in Figure 1. First,
the rms choose qualities as described above. This involves a decision about participation
to the national labeling program and, by entrantsquality decisions, the number of active
rms at the production stage of the game.20 Second, the consumers and the rms form
their prior beliefs about qualities in the market. Third, the rms set prices, on the basis
17This assumption ensures that so-called niteness property holds, hence, the market is a natural oligopoly
under full information. See Anderson et al. (1992).
18For a similar treatment of rmsentry decisions in a vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly, see e.g. Peitz (2002).
19For instance, when rm 2 is the rst-mover and incumbent 1 is the follower, rm 1 observes that quality
distribution on the market is 1(a2) = a2: After the quality decision of rm 1, the rst entrant N observes the
existing qualities and based on a2 and a1, its assessment of overall quality on the market isN (a2; a1) = (a2+a1)=2.
20That is, each entrant that chooses a quality aN > 0 is considered an active rm.
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which the consumers update their beliefs. Firms can set a single price within each country,
but can price discriminate consumers across markets.
t
Stage 0
Labeling
requirement
Firms:
Sequential quality
choice and entry
Firms:
Set prices on
export market
Firms:
Set prices on
domestic market
Consumers:
Posterior assessment
of qualities
Consumers:
Posterior assessment
of qualities
Stage 1 Stage 3Stage 2
SignalingQuality
Figure 1: Timing of the game
3 Full-Information Benchmark
This section derives the equilibrium under full information and imperfect competition. Full infor-
mation benchmark comes in useful as a starting point for the analysis of the quality competition
under asymmetric information and welfare comparisons under di¤erent labeling schemes. To
perform the welfare comparisons, we rst establish a Pareto e¢ ciency benchmark, which will be
used when considering the welfare loss associated with market imperfections:
Denition 1 (Pareto e¢ ciency) Let p(a) denote the market price of the good with quality a.
A necessary requirement for Pareto-e¢ ciency is given by
p(a)  p(a)  (  )(a  a) for all  2 [; ] and a 2 [a; a]: (4)
Pareto-e¢ ciency thus requires that quality a is produced and each consumer buys this quality
at a price that yields her a nonnegative surplus in comparison to other varieties in the market.
For future reference it is worth noting that this allocation obtains when 9p(a) : p(a) = C(a):
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3.1 Full-Information Benchmark
Suppose that the market consists of two rms, 1 and 2.21 The rms produce goods x1 and x2
with environmental qualities a1 and a2; respectively. For the ease of exposition we assume that
the qualities satisfy a1 < a2, and the market is fully covered.
Denote the customer who is indi¤erent between buying x1 and x2 at prices p1 and p2 as b:
Since the ranking of preferences is inverse, each consumer with  < ^ buys the higher quality,
and consumers  > ^ buy the lower quality. The demand for x2 and x1 can thus be formalized
as D2 = Mb and D1 = M(1   b); respectively. Using consumersutility function we obtainb =   (p2   p1)=(a2   a1); hence, the prots can be written as
2(p2; p1l ) =M
b[p2   C(a2)]  2(a2);
1(p2; p1) =M(1  b)[p1   C(a1)]  1(a1);
where 2(a2) = ; and 1(a1) =  for a1 > a and 1(a) = 0. The rms choose prices taking
the quality decisions and the associated sunk costs as given. The rst-order conditions yield the
following equilibrium price levels:
p^2 = 1=3[(+ 1)(a2   a1) + 2C(a2) + C(a1)] (5)
p^1 = 1=3[(2  )(a2   a1) + 2C(a1) + C(a2)]: (6)
It is easy to verify that (5) and (6) express the equilibrium prices.22 Hence, we infer that
Lemma 1 In a full-information equilibrium, qualities are such that a  a1 < a2  a and b < :
The quality distribution in the market does not satisfy the criteria for Pareto-e¢ cient allocation
Proof. The rst part of the proof is by contradiction. Assume a < a1 = a2  a; by
Bertrand argument the long-term prot is i =   < 0; i = 1; 2. Hence, the equilibrium is
strictly dominated by any quality distribution that involves a  a1 < a2  a. Assume then that
a = a1 = a2. (1) together with (5) and (6) imply that for given a = a1; an increase in a2 yields a
21Although the model allows for entry, we assume only two rms. This is for expositional purposes to illustrate
the perfect information benchmark. A condition which determines the upper bound for active rms can be found
in Cremer and Thisse (1999).
22For a similar analysis of the price game, see e.g. Cremer and Thisse (1999).
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positive mark-up for each rm. Quality distribution a = a1 = a2, in turn entails i = 0; i = 1; 2;
hence, this distribution is strictly dominated by a  a1 < a2  a.
The proof of the second part is a straightforward consequence of (4) and the rst-part of
Lemma 1. Since both rms are active in equilibrium, at least one consumer buys the good with
quality a1 < a. Hence, the equilibrium does not satisfy (4).
This result establishes that both incumbent rms are active and produce di¤erentiated goods
with prices above their marginal cost. The quality di¤erence depends on the parameters of
the model. However, Lemma 1 unambiguously establishes the quality allocation is not welfare-
optimal. The reason is that the rm producing higher quality can price-discriminate consumers
with a lower willingness contributing to a ine¢ cient market outcome as some consumers do not
buy quality a.23
4 Asymmetric-Information Benchmark in Autarky
When environmental quality of the goods is a credence attribute, the consumers know the distri-
bution of qualities in the market, but the quality-di¤erences cannot be veried without further
information.24 Since the consumers have information on the rms cost function and on the
prices posted on the market, but cannot link the qualities with the rms, the rms can use prices
as a signal of quality. This signaling game is the focus of the analysis in this section. For the
reasons of tractability we consider rst a generic game played in a single market. The results
will then be used as a stepping stone in the analysis of eco-labeling and international trade.
4.1 Consumer Beliefs and Demand
Suppose that the market consist of two active rms.25 The rms rst set prices and consumers
then draw inferences about the actual qualities of goods in the market. The equilibrium of
23This result coincides with previous studies on vertical product di¤erentiation. For example, Crampes and
Hollander (1995) show that although high-quality producer could capture the entire market, it is more protable
to allow lower qualities exist on the market.
24This is arguably a rather extreme assumption, but it is widely used in models of oligopoly signaling. See
e.g. Herzendorf and Overgaard (2000); Herzendorf and Overgaard (2001); and Fluet and Garella (2002). A good
example which can be used to justify the assumption is the forest industry. In forest industry a consumer has an
idea of di¤erences in forest management practises, but cannot ascertain whether the wood inputs used to produce
the nal goods originate from sustainable sources known to exist.
25 It will be shown that in equilibrium only two rms are active.
11
the signaling game is thus a pair of prices and a system of posterior beliefs about product
qualities. The solution mechanism of the game is the following. Starting from the last stage,
we determine the set of price-pairs that implement a belief system consistent with the denition
of the separating equilibrium. This involves the analysis of the evolution of consumersbeliefs
and corresponding demand functions. Given the consumersbelief system, the second step is to
investigate rmssignaling strategies, which determines the equilibrium outcome for any given
quality distribution. Finally, we examine the rmsquality and entry decisions.
Let p = (p1; p2; a1; a2) and s = (p1; p2; a1; a2) denote the beliefs when qualities are
veriable and unveriable by consumers, respectively. Furthermore, given prices p1 and p2; let
1(p1; p2) denote the consumers assessment that rm 1s quality is a2. This belief system satises
1(p1; p2) = 1  2(p1; p2); where 2(p1; p2) is the consumers assessment that rm 2s quality is
a2:26
Consumers know the cost functions of the rms and infer that the price of a variety a2 must
yield a non-negative mark-up for the producer, i.e. p2  C(a2). Hence, the belief system exhibits
the following properties:
Lemma 2 Suppose that a2 > a1: Given qualities (a1; a2); prices (p1; p2) and costs [C(a1); C(a2)];
system (p1; p2; a1; a2) is such that
(i)  = p, i.e. 1(p1; p2) = 1=2 iff p1; p2 2 [C(a2); p];
(ii)  = s, i.e. 1(p1; p2) = 0 iff p1 2 [C(a1); C(a2)); where p = R+ a2.
Proof. Lemma 2 requires that all observed prices must be admissible. Hence,
(i) For prices p1; p2 2 [C(a2); p], where p = R + a2 is the choke-o¤ price, consumers infer
that any rm charging p  C(a2) could be selling quality a2: Hence, a consumer expects that
any good in the market is of the higher quality with probability 1=2:
(ii) The rms will not set prices below their marginal-cost. Thus, a price p1 < C(a2) implies
that the rm setting price p1 is producing quality a1; and leads the consumers to update their
beliefs accordingly.
Lemma 2 establishes that the consumers beliefs are determined through the low-quality
rms pricing decision. Consequently, implementation of separating beliefs requires that rm 1
26Since the market consists of two product varieties, the beliefs are such that 1(p1; p2) + 2(p1; p2) = 1:
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has an incentive reveal its true type. Otherwise, no separating equilibrium exists.27
Using Lemma 2 the demand system, D  ( bD2; bD1); can be written as
D 
8>>><>>>:
(Mb;M(1  b)) for  = s
(M=2;M=2) for  = p : p1 = p2 < R+ (  1)c(a1; a2)
(0;M) for  = p : p1 < p2  R+ (  1)c(a1; a2)
where c(a1; a2) = (a1+a2)=2 denotes the expected quality in the market. The system is derived
using the consumersassessments about qualities and responses to the observed price-di¤erential.
First, when consumers observe the actual qualities, the demand system coincides with the one
under full information. Second, in a pooling equilibrium, the rms split the market with equal
prices. Finally, when the consumer cannot link the rms and qualities, a rm with lower price
captures the entire market, because consumers are willing to pay a single price for any good in
the market.
4.2 Price Signaling
Having analyzed how consumers update their beliefs after realizing the prices in the market,
we move on to the analysis of rmspricing strategies. The analysis is in three steps. First, we
show that full-information prices do not constitute an equilibrium under asymmetric information.
Then we investigate the existence of price-pairs, which constitute separating equilibria. Finally,
after the determination of the set of potential equilibrium price-pairs, we solve for an equilibrium
that cannot be destabilized by one-stage deviations.
Consider rm 1s price decision when it conjectures that rm 2 has set its price equal to
full-information level. Lemma 2 establishes that a separating equilibrium requires the rm with
lower quality to reveal its type. In Appendix A we show that given the full-information price
level p^2, rm 1s optimal price-response is
p1 = p^2 for p^2  R+ (  1)c(a1; a2)
p1  p^2 for p^2 > R+ (  1)c(a1; a2);
(7)
27 It is important to note that Lemma 2 describes the basic belief system, which abstracts from renements that
rely on out-of-equilibrium prices. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs will be treated in more detail below.
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where p^1 and p^2 denote full-information price levels. Hence, full-information prices do not
constitute an equilibrium under asymmetric information. This is because rm 1 observes that
for given p^2; it can split the entire market for the goods by imitating rm 2. If p^2 is high enough,
so that pooling induces partial market-coverage, rm 1 captures the entire market and increases
its prot by setting p1 = R+( 1)c(a1; a2), i.e. just the price for which it captures the entire
market for the expected quality c(a1; a2).
In order to determine whether there is a price pair that constitutes a separating equilibrium,
we need to consider rm 1s best-response to all admissible prices p2 2 [C(a2); R+]. To this end,
consider rm 1s best-response correspondence, p1(p2). A price p2 that implements a separating
equilibrium is such that rm 1 rather reveals its type by setting p1 < C(a2) than imitates rm
2. In Appendix A we show that the best-response of rm 1 is always (weakly) higher than the
marginal cost of the rm with higher quality:
Proposition 1 Regardless of the di¤erences between the rmsenvironmental quality, the rm
producing higher environmental quality cannot induce the low-quality rm to reveal its actual
quality to consumers. Hence, no separating equilibria exist.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This proposition states that rm 2 cannot implement a separating equilibrium. The reason
is that for p2 > C(a2); by setting p1 = p2   "; rm 1 captures the entire market, where the
consumers buy goods with expected quality c(a1; a2)  a1. For p2 = C(a2); rm 1; in turn,
imitates rm 2 and charges p1 = C(a2) rather than reveals its type.
We have now determined the set of potential equilibria in the signaling game. To establish
the strategically stable equilibrium, however, requires a brief look at how the consumers update
their beliefs on the basis of observed out-of-equilibrium prices. Consider a candidate equilibrium:
~p1 = ~p2 > C(a2): The strict inequality implies that each rm can increase its prot by slightly
cutting the price-level. A price-cut could be inferred as a defection by the low quality rm, but
the consumer has no reason to rule out the possibility that the lower price is set by the one with
quality a2. Hence, when consumer observes prices p1 < p2; she updates her beliefs to 1() = 0;
if and only if p1 < C(a2).28 This result gives raise to the following proposition:
28 It is important to note that we abstract from equilibrium renements that are consistent with another equilib-
rium. Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) argue that no defection should be considered in isolation.
Their idea is that an equilibrium can be destabilized only by another equilibrium, not by an isolated defection.
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Proposition 2 Equilibrium prices equal the marginal cost of the high-quality rm C(a2). Al-
though rm 2 makes zero short-term prot, it will not be driven out of the market. Firm 1s
mark-up equals the di¤erence between the rmsmarginal costs, i.e.
1h(a
1; a2) = (M=2)[C(a2)  C(a1)] > 0
2h(a
1; a2) = (M=2)[C(a2)  C(a2)] = 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result can be understood intuitively as follows. A candidate pooling equilibrium-candidate
with a prior belief-system c(a2; a1) > a1 and prices p1 = p2 > C(a2), does not constitute an
equilibrium. This is because the equilibrium is destabilized by a price-cut on behalf any of the
two rms, insofar as consumersbeliefs about product quality are una¤ected by such defection.
For p1 = p2 = C(a2); a price-cut results in an update of consumer beliefs, so that a rm with
price p0 < C(a2) is producing lower quality with certainty.
Although the equilibrium outcome is driven by Bertrand-type argument, the characterization
of the equilibrium is quite di¤erent. From the consumersviewpoint, each good in the market
has the same expected quality and the evolution of the belief system allows the rms to cut
prices similarly as in a standard Bertrand game. However, the cost di¤erence implies that, in
equilibrium, both rms are active since no rm can feasibly set its price below C(a2): This is
because by setting p1 < C(a2), the rm 1 would induce a shift in consumer beliefs, which by
condition (3) results in zero demand for its product.
4.3 Quality Game
The quality subgame involves three stages.29 First, the incumbent 2 chooses its quality. Second,
incumbent 1 observes that market consists of quality a2 and chooses a1. Finally, the entrants
observe the quality distribution in the market and choose to enter, i.e. set aN  a or remain
passive.
The incumbents anticipate the potential entrants quality decisions and observe that the
price-premium generated by choosing a higher abatement level will be fully appropriated by the
29For a similar treatment of rmsquality decision under threat of entry, see e.g. Peitz (2002).
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rivals. This implies negative payo¤ in the long-term, and thus, the optimal strategy for each
incumbent is quality a:
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information without labeling, the market consist of two in-
cumbent rms producing at the minimum quality level, a:
Proof. Consider the incumbent 2s quality decision. Letting aN (a2; a1) denote the entrants
quality decision given the incumbentsqualities, the incumbent rm 2s program is given by
max
a2
2[a2; a1; aN (a2; a1)] = (M=n)[p2(a2; a1; aN )  C(ai)]  2(a2);
s:t:
p2(a2; a1; aN ) = C(a2) for a2  a
where aN (a2; a1) is the entrants best response function to incumbents quality decisions and
 = n + 2 for aN (a2; a1)  a; and  = 2 for aN (a2; a1) = a. It is su¢ cient to show that rm
2 always chooses a2 = a; for this induces a1 = a and aN (a2; a1) = a: Suppose rm 2 chooses
a2 > a: By Proposition 2, this implies that the rm 1 with lower quality can capture positive
rent by choosing a1 = a: This yields a negative long-term prot for rm 2. Hence, an optimal
strategy for rm 2 involves a2 = a, which implements a1 = a and aN (a1; a2) = a.
A rm that chooses to abate more than the minimal requirement a, raises the overall quality
and the price level in the market. This generates an information rent for the rms producing
lower quality. Anticipating this, the rms have diminished incentives to improve their quality
for it yields a negative long-term prot. Hence, only the incumbent rms can feasibly produce
for the market, but the quality level will be ine¢ ciently low.30 This result is typical in models
with asymmetric information, like those in Akerlof (1970) and Leland (1979). However, unlike
these papers, the present model allows for endogenous quality choice. The welfare implication
of the result is nevertheless that provision of quality is minimal and therefore lower than under
full information with two active rms.
30 It is worth noting that raising the minimum quality standard would imply negative long-term prot as the
competition would drive the price premium to zero for each active rm.
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5 Third-Party Labeling and Trade
This section examines the role third-party labeling-programs in the domestic and export markets.
The rms set a single price within each market, but can price discriminate between markets. It is
thus convenient to analyze the market outcomes separately. In what follows, the rst subsection
introduces national labeling requirements and examines rmsquality decisions in autarky. The
second subsection examines the industry equilibrium in the export market under mutual recog-
nition of labels. Finally, we analyze whether the equilibrium properties in the export-market
inuence the domestic market, and compare the welfare implications under di¤erent presump-
tions about the labeling requirements.
5.1 Labeling in Autarky
Suppose that a domestic labeling intermediary imposes a requirement ad : a  ad > a, which
the local rms must meet to be eligible for quality-certication, Ld. Consumers observe that
any rm i with a label Ld is producing with quality ai  ad. It is however important to note
that if the market consists of two labeled goods with qualities aj > ai  ad; the label does not
provide ranking between the goods in terms of their quality. Hence, the problem of asymmetric
information is present in each sub-market with more than one product variety.
A feasible standard ad must satisfy the following participation constraint for rm 2:
2[a1(a2); a2;aN (a1; a2)]  0 for a2  ad; (8)
where aN (a1; a2) = [a3(a1; a2); a4(); :::; an()] denotes the quality response of the entrants and
a1(a2) that of the incumbent 1. The constraint simply states that a successful program yields a
non-negative long-term prot for the participating rms.
Consider then the rmsquality decisions. Starting from the last stage of the quality game,
the rst entrant takes the existing qualities in the market as given and chooses whether to enter
the market. The optimal quality choice is the following:
aN (a1; a2)
8>>><>>>:
= ad for a
i > ad and a
j = a
= a for ai = ad and a
j > a
= 0 for ai = ad and a
j = a;
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where i; j = 1; 2 denote the existing qualities in the market and aN = 0 refers to the case of no
entry. The solution for this problem is simple: The entrant N chooses to enter, when it observes
quality levels higher than ad or a. This follows immediately from the previous results implying
that the information rent in each sub-market can be fully appropriated by an entrant that has
a lower quality-level than an incumbent rm. However, when the incumbents choose qualities
ad and a, entry yields negative long-term prot for the entrant. As a result, such initial quality
distribution discourages entry and leads to a duopoly outcome in the market.
Firm 1 anticipates the entrants response to incumbents quality-decisions. Hence, given
incumbent 2s quality level ad or a, rm 1s quality-response becomes
a1(a2)
8<: = ad for a2 = a= a for a2 = ad:
The reason why rm 1s choice is involves just qualities ad and a, is that for any other quality
level, either rm 2 or the entrants appropriate the rent associated with increase in rm 1s quality.
Given the followersresponses, a similar reasoning applies for rm 2; and its decision boils
down to choosing between quality levels ad and a: Thus, when requirement is such that
2(a2; a1) = 2[p^2(ad); p^
1(a)] > 2[p^2(a); p^1(ad)]; (9)
where p^2() and p^1() denote the full information prices, rm 2 chooses a2 = ad. If the inequality
is reversed, rm 2 chooses a2 = a and rm 1s response is a1 = ad: In both cases, entry is deterred
by the incumbents, because the entrants observe that entry with a higher quality level leads to
a signaling game which yields negative long-term prot.
Hence, the resulting equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 3 In autarky, a labeling program implements an outcome that coincides with the full
information equilibrium involving qualities a1 = a and a2 = ad. Regardless of the standard ad;
the market equilibrium does not satisfy the criteria for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the analysis and the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 ensures that the outcome is not welfare optimal.
Lemma 3 implies that only the incumbent rms with qualities ad and a survive the competi-
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tion. This, in turn, means that the high-quality rm can price discriminate the consumers with
lower willingness to pay. Hence, the equilibrium does not satisfy the criteria for Pareto e¢ ciency
as there is a segment of consumers not buying the high quality good.
5.2 Equilibrium Pricing in the Export-Market
The importing country has no domestic production of x. Under mutual recognition of labels,
the labeled sub-market involves two qualities, ad and af , but the di¤erence between the qualities
indicated by the labels cannot be veried by the consumers. The consumers prior belief about
the quality of a good with a label is therefore c(ad; af ) > ad, when ad < af . When the
labeling standards are harmonized, there is a full information in the labeled sub-market, i.e.
c(ad; af ) = ad.
When the consumers cannot observe the quality di¤erence between the labels, the equilibrium
in the export market has the following properties:
Lemma 4 Suppose that each producing country has a labeling program that allows rms with
quality ad (af ) carry a label Ld (Lf ). In the export market:
(i) Harmonizing requirements (i.e. af = ad) implies that only labeled goods are exported and
sold at marginal cost.
(ii) Mutually recognized labels with qualities af > ad > a; induce a pooling equilibrium,
where the consumers beliefs about the qualities are given by c(af ; ad) > ad and prices equal
the marginal cost of the rm with higher quality, i.e. p2d = p
2
f = C(af ). Each rm with a label
survives in the export market.
(iii) When the quality di¤erence is small, each consumer rather buys a labeled good than an
unlabeled one. Hence, the unlabeled goods will be driven out of the export market if
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a]  C(af ) for af   ad > ; (10)
where  is a critical parameter that determines the quality di¤erence under which the consumers
are just indi¤erent between buying a good with expected quality c(af ; ad) and a good with a
certain quality a for a marginal cost prices C(a) and C(af ).
Proof. Result (i) follows immediately from a Bertrand argument and condition (1). Part
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(ii) is a consequence of Lemma 3: When ad < af the labeled rms from country d prefer to
pool rather than set their prices below C(af ), indicating that the optimal pricing strategy for the
rms with a label Ld is p2d = p
2
f = C(af ). Part (iii) follows directly from comparisons consumers
surplus: For p2d = p
2
f = C(af ), the expected quality of a labeled good 
c(af ; ad) yields a higher
surplus than the unlabeled variety, insofar as the quality di¤erence is small enough. For instance,
when ad ! af , no consumer will purchase an unlabeled good, and the market for a does not
exist.
The rst part of the result is straightforward. In equilibrium, rms with identical costs and
qualities end up setting marginal-cost prices. By condition (3) this drives the unlabeled variety
out of the market. The second part argues that the labeled sub-market exhibits pooling, when the
labeling requirements are not harmonized. The reasoning is similar to that of Proposition 2: For
any given price p2f ; a labeled rm from country d will not reveal its true type, and consequently,
all labeled producers set their prices equal to marginal cost of the high-quality producer. These
prices are just high enough to keep all rms active and sustain pooling beliefs.
The third part argues that the quality distribution in the export market depends on the
steepness of the consumers utility function and that of the cost function. When the con-
sumers have strong preferences for environmental quality, they rather buy any good with a
label than a good without one. This property holds locally when the quality-di¤erence is small,
i.e. c(af ; ad) ! af ; and globally when ad ! a, provided that the cost function is su¢ ciently
at.
Figure 3a describes a polar case which illustrates the third part of Lemma 4. In this case
the cost function is relatively at and ad ! a. Consumer  observes that the expected quality
of labeled goods is lower than the highest quality available, but for a price equal to C(af ); she
rather buys a labeled good than an unlabeled one, the low-quality rms split the unlabeled sub-
market and make zero prot.31 This is illustrated in Figure 3b, where consumers  =  purchase
the unlabeled variety.
31 In Figures 3a and 3b, CS[c(af ; ad)] denotes the di¤erence between consumer surplus when buying labeled
goods instead of unlabeled ones for marginal cost prices, C(af ) and C(a); respectively.
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Figure 3a:
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a] > C(af )
Figure 3b:
(  )[c(af ; ad)  a] < C(af )
5.3 Welfare Analysis
This section derives the linkages between the markets of the model. In particular, we examine
whether the information rent in the export market is su¢ ciently high to induce entry in the
producing countries, and thereby inuence the quality distribution and pricing in the markets of
the producing countries.
When the rms have the option to produce for both domestic and export markets, the entry
decision is driven by two e¤ects. First, Lemma 3 implies that in autarky, entry induces zero short-
term prot in the domestic market, regardless of the labeling requirements of the foreign country.
Second, a di¤erence between the labeling requirements generates a rent in the export market.
When this rent is high enough, it outweighs the xed cost of entry, and therefore, increases the
number of labeled producers. The market implications of these e¤ects are described in more
detail in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 Suppose that (10) holds. If af > ad the industry-equilibrium is such that
(i) Each domestic rm chooses quality ad and makes positive prots in the export market:
2d(ad; af ) = [M=(n+ 3)][C(af )  C(ad)] > 0:
Marginal-cost pricing implies zero-prot for the foreign rm.
(ii) Domestic market consists of n + 2 labeled rms. Each rm produces quality ad, and
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charges prices equal to C(ad).
Under harmonized labeling requirements af = ad; the market outcome in the producing coun-
tries coincides with the full information benchmark with qualities a and ad. Only labeled rms
produce for the export market, in which prices equal marginal cost.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 5 establishes that a di¤erence between labeling requirements increases the number
of rms with label Ld. In domestic market this induces tougher competition, and consequently,
increases the market share of the labeled variety. Under harmonized labeling requirements,
rmsprots in the export market are zero. Since the incumbent can deter entry in the domestic
country, the lack of competition in the producing countries implies that the quality distribution
coincides with the one under autarky.
The following result illustrates the welfare implications of this pro-competitive e¤ect of mutual
recognition of national eco-labels.
Proposition 4 For any given af , a labeling schedule with requirement ad = af "; where "! 0;
is welfare-superior to harmonized labels, ad = af . In particular, when af = a, the property ad
= a  " implements an outcome that approaches Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of quality in country
d and export market.
When the standards are harmonized, the export market exhibits marginal-cost pricing, but
the producing have only one labeled producer which can price-discriminate its customers with
a lower willingness to pay for products environmental quality. This means that, in comparison
to mutual recognition of labeling standards, the lack of competition in the labeled sub-market
leads to Pareto-inferior outcome in the domestic markets.
Proposition 4 states that there is a positive spillover associated with mutual recognition which
can correct for ine¢ ciently low provision of quality in domestic market. To further emphasize
this e¤ect, suppose that af = a: A small di¤erence between the labeling requirements changes the
market-structure through an information rent in the export-market, generating an incentive for
new producers to apply for domestic label. An increase in the number labeled rms intensies the
price-competition in domestic market, and consequently, drives the prices down toward marginal-
costs. Su¢ ciently low prices allow all domestic consumers to purchase the labeled variety, and
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unlabeled goods will be driven out of the market. It then follows that when labeling requirement
of the foreign country is a and the di¤erence between the requirements is small, the outcome in
the domestic market satises the criteria for Pareto-e¢ ciency.
While this result provides a stylized argument for mutual recognition of labels, it should be
noted that such an outcome in all markets is unfeasible. This is because it requires that only
quality a is produced and purchased by each individual in all countries. Based in the above
considerations this cannot be implemented through labeling or by imposing minimum quality
standards.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the structure of an international vertically di¤erentiated industry, and the
welfare implications of harmonization and mutual recognition of national eco-labels. The analysis
shows that a di¤erence between labeling requirements induces a positive spillover in a country
which applies lower standards to its producers. The e¤ect is generated through an information
rent in the export-market which increases the number of labeled producers, and thereby improves
the aggregate environmental quality of goods.
More specically, under full information, the overall quality in the market falls short of
Pareto-e¢ ciency. Second, asymmetric information drives all goods produced with higher abate-
ment level out of the market, and consequently, only goods with minimal environmental quality
will be produced. The problem of asymmetric information can be mitigated by establishing a
labeling program. In autarky, the program improves quality provision, but yet the allocation
of environmental quality is ine¢ cient. This is because incumbent rms can deter entry in the
labeled sub-market and then price-discriminate consumers with a lower willingness to pay for
the goodsenvironmental quality.
Mutual recognition of labels with di¤erent standards generates an information rent in the
export market for the rms with lower standards. The rent also yields positive prot for the en-
trants and thereby intensies price-competition in domestic market as the number of the labeled
rms increases. In other words, a small imperfection in the form of lower market transparency
in the export market intensies competition, and makes the high quality goods more a¤ordable
to consumers in the producing countries. This increases the consumerssurplus and diminishes
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the production related environmental externalities. Under harmonized labeling requirements the
incumbent rms can deter entry, which diminishes the share of high quality products in domestic
market. A welfare comparison between mutual recognition and harmonization thus reveals that
under mutual recognition a small di¤erence between labeling standards Pareto-dominates the
full information outcome with harmonized labels.
Appendix A
Proof of (7). The proof involves two cases. (a) fully covered markets p^2 < R+( 1)c(a1; a2)
and (b) partially covered markets p^2 > R+ (  1)c(a1; a2).
(a) Full market coverage implies that when p1 = p^2 each consumer buys the good so that
the rms split the demand. If the full information prices constitute an equilibrium, the following
condition holds 1[p1; p^2;p]  1(p^1; p^2;s): This can be written as
1
2

p^2   C(a1)  1  + (p^2   p1l )
(a2   a1)

[p^1   C(a1)]:
Substituting the closed form expression for p^2 yields:
(+ 1)(a2   a1) + 2C(a2)  2(1  ^) (  1)(a2   a1) + C(a1) + C(a2) :
Since  + 1 > 2(1   ^)(   1) and 2C(a2) > C(a1) + C(a2), we conclude that full information
prices do not constitute an equilibrium.
(b) Partial market coverage implies that some consumers refuse to buy the good at price
p^2. Observe rst that C(a)  R; hence, it is su¢ cient to show that by setting p1 = R + (  
1)c(a1; a2); rm 1 can capture the entire market, and the payo¤ is higher than in the case
p1 < C(a2): This condition can be written as
R+ (  1)c(a1; a2)  C(a1) > (1  ^)[p^1   C(a1)]:
The properties 1   ^ < 1 and R + (   1)c(a1; a2) > p^1 readily show that pooling is indeed
optimal for rm 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1. To show that rm 2 can induce rm 1 to reveal its true type, we
must prove that there is p2 that induces a response p1 < C(a2): Formally, this requires
~p1 = argmax
p1
1(p1; p2; s) (11)
1(~p1; p2;s)  1(p2; p2;p) : ~p1 < C(a2) (12)
Expression (11) states that ~p1 must be a prot maximizer for rm 1 given beliefs s; (12) sates
that in an equilibrium, rm 1 has no incentives to pool.
We have already showed that for R+ (  1)c(a1; a2)  p2 > C(a2) rm 1 can capture the
entire market by setting p1 = p2   ".32 Plugging this into (12) and evaluating at " ! 0; the
condition becomes:
(1  ^)[p1   C(a1)]  p2   C(a1) :
This is obviously a contradiction since (1  ^) < 1. For p2 = C(a2), condition (3) states implies
that rm 1 reveals its type if
0  1
2

C(a2)  C(a1) :
This is a contradiction.33 Hence, no separating equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows the same lines of reasoning as the proof
of Proposition 1. Consider an equilibrium candidate (~p1; ~p2) : ~p1 = ~p2 > C(a2). By Bertrand-
argument we infer that each rm can destabilize the equilibrium by lowering its price marginally:
e.g. p1 = ~p2   "; and capture the entire market.
Price-cutting is (weakly) benecial for both rms insofar as the strategy proles satisfy ~p2  
" = C(a2). Letting "! 0; the equilibrium price-pair thus becomes (~p1; ~p2) = [C(a2); C(a2)] with
payo¤s 1(a1; a2) = (M=2)

C(a2)  C(a1) > 0 and 2(a1; a2) = (M=2) C(a2)  C(a2) = 0.
This equilibrium is strategically stable for the following reasons: (a) Since the rm with
lower price captures the entire market, neither rm can increase its payo¤ by upward price-
deviation. (b) Price-cutting implies negative prot for rm 2. In terms of price-cost margin per
unit of output, rm 1 would make positive prot by cutting its price. However, since rm 1s
32For p2 > R+ (  1)c(a1; a2); the optimal strategy for rm 1 is obviously p2 > p1  R+ (  1)c(a1; a2):
33This follows immediately from that for a price p2 = C(a2) induces all consumers to buy good x2:
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conjectures that the rival will keep its price xed at p2 = C(a2); it infers that when beliefs are
updated according to the observed signal p1 < C(a2), each consumer would buy the good with
quality a2; implying zero demand.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 5. The rst part states that (i) all domestic rms produce with quality ad
and (ii) the foreign rm is active in the export market.
(i) Lemma 4 readily shows that export market exhibits pooling and the cost advantage
for domestic rms is C(af )   C(ad) per unit of output. For the domestic entrants this implies
positive payo¤ from entry. Hence, each entrant produces quality ad. Condition (3) and a standard
Bertrand argument ensures that domestic market with multiple rms with quality ad induces
marginal cost pricing in the labeled sub-market and thus zero demand for the unlabeled variety.
Thus, all domestic rms choose quality ad.
(ii) This follows immediately from that foreign country has positive mark-up in the local
market which provides an incentive to participate the labeling program.
The second part argues that under identical labeling requirements, domestic market equilib-
rium coincides with the full information outcome with qualities ad and a: Bertrand argument
ensures that market outcome in the export market involves marginal-cost pricing, and conse-
quently, zero prot for all labeled rms. Thus, Lemma 4 ensures that entry yields negative
prot in both in domestic and in the export market, indicating that the market in the producing
countries involves only 2 rms producing qualities a and ad:
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